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a cold, impersonal, corporate world. That may not be the last word 
on modem libel law, but it is a good beginning. 
POLITICS, DEMOCRACY, AND THE SUPREME 
COURT: ESSAYS ON THE FRONTIER OF CONSTITU-
TIONAL THEORY. By ArthurS. Miller.1 Westport, Ct.: 
Greenwood Press. 1985. Pp. viii, 368. $35.00. 
GOD, COUNTRY AND THE SUPREME COURT. By 
James K. Fitzpatrick. Chicago, 11.: Regnery Books. 1985. 
Pp. X, 217. $18.95. 
Scott G. Knudson 2 
Professor Arthur Miller's most recent book is a collection of 
essays, all but one of which were first published in various legal 
periodicals from 1974 to 1984. Some of the topics are fairly narrow. 
Several, however, raise the most sweeping jurisprudential issues. In 
an introductory essay, Professor Miller suggests that constitutional 
jurisprudence is dominated by several myths-for example, the 
myth of separation of powers. More broadly, Miller argues that 
scholars should recognize that the Supreme Court is one of the 
political branches of the government, to be analyzed as such. 
In his central essay in the second chapter, Miller lays out his 
thesis that constitutional study should not focus simply on the Con-
stitution of 1787, but on three "constitutions" -political, economic, 
and corporate-which determine how America is organized and di-
rected. Miller carries this theme throughout the book, arguing in 
the third essay that we are moving from a constitution of powers to 
a constitution of control, under which modem technology will in-
crease the concentration of state power, resulting in an increased 
emphasis on state security and mass control measures. 
Miller asserts that orthodox constitutional thought is perme-
ated by a basic myth: that ours is a government of limited powers, 
as set forth in the Constitution. Borrowing a concept from Profes-
sor Michael Reisman, Professor Miller calls this myth the jurispru-
dential publique, the orthodox constitutional law of lawyers, judges 
and most scholars. The reality, he says, is ajurisprudence confiden-
tie/le, the private and largely unwritten set of rules that govern the 
I. Professor Emeritus, George Washington University National Law Center. 
2. Attorney, Latham & Watkins, Washington, D.C. 
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behavior of governmental officers. No constitutional theory can be 
accurate unless it incorporates these informal rules. 
Miller says that eighteen principles make up the political con-
stitution; one of these principles, for example, is that the political 
constitution is evolutionary, changing in interpretation and applica-
tion as circumstances change. 
The principles of the economic constitution are strongly pro-
capitalist, with the state delegating the power to govern to property 
owners, who have biased the law in favor of their class. Miller's 
anti-corporate attitude is evident, as he asserts that the corporation 
is part of the growing social stratification that has subordinated the 
individual while increasing the power of a governmental and corpo-
rate bureaucracy that dominates society. For instance, he thinks 
that universities have become mere service stations for corporate 
America. 
The third essay focuses on Miller's concern with the increasing 
power of the state to use modem technology to concentrate power 
to control masses of society. Although America has been governed 
by a constitution of powers, Miller asserts that a combination of 
crises (like commodity shortages, ecological dangers, and the threat 
of nuclear war) is moving us toward a constitution of control. Once 
a country of bountiful resources, America is facing a shortage of 
affordably priced resources that will curtail our standard of living. 
Further, Miller argues that the technological advances that brought 
this country to its high standard of living will also enable the state 
to centralize power and to control the populace. As examples, he 
mentions the advance in microprocessing, which can destroy pri-
vacy, and the National Security Agency, which has a far-reaching 
ability to monitor overseas communications. 
Professor Miller's other essays deal with narrower topics, such 
as Wisconsin's open primary law (struck down by the Supreme 
Court), the status of corporations under the fourteenth amendment, 
and emergency powers, most of which relate in some way to his 
prediction that we are headed for a super-government that eventu-
ally will control all of American society. 
His conclusion, that scarcity will force America to move from 
a "constitution of powers" to a "constitution of control" (read po-
lice state), strikes me as too facile. Similar apocalyptic predictions 
have been made before; they are notoriously unreliable. Human in-
genuity and self-interest have responded to past needs; there is no 
reason to expect that solutions for new problems cannot again be 
found. Not long ago, neo-Malthusians predicted that reserves of oil 
were likely to be consumed within a decade. Since then, there have 
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been changes in energy consumption, partly because of regulations, 
but also because of market forces that have led to a surprising drop 
in oil prices. 
Miller fails to recognize that modern technology can be a de-
mocratizing force. The personal computer, for instance, decentral-
izes the analytical tools needed to be effective in modern society, 
enabling a clever but small entrepreneur to compete against a large 
corporation. Nothing in our history indicates that the necessary 
adjustments cannot be accomplished through market-induced tech-
nological change and supply and consumption adjustments. Com-
pulsory adjustment measures, even if necessary because of some 
short-term event (a new Arab oil embargo, for example), do not 
presage the coming of a police state. 
Miller's very negative views of the future are evident in his ar-
gument that the mass media will be a tool to produce this new state. 
He does not explain how the press will become subservient to the 
state. Why will the media manipulate public opinion to serve the 
ruling elite's view of the national interest? Individual newspapers 
or networks may be manipulated from time to time, but isolated 
instances do not mean that the press is prone to extensive and pro-
longed manipulation. To effect that level of control, a strong and 
enduring consensus would have to exist between the ruling elite and 
the editors and publishers and news directors. In my view, this uni-
formity of views is nowhere evident. The press, let us recall, helped 
to destroy McGovern and Hart as well as Nixon, Johnson as well as 
Goldwater. The publishers tended to dislike Franklin Roosevelt, 
yet his power was partly due to skillful use of the media. Much the 
same can be said of President Reagan. The Defense Department 
knows the art of propaganda; but "peace activists" and disarma-
ment receive extensive and largely favorable publicity. Unfortu-
nately, such complexities and nuances are missing from Professor 
Miller's world-view. 
One might suppose that Miller would welcome any decision of 
the Court that expanded the potential for vigorous political debate 
as a means to forestall the development of a constitution of control. 
In fact, however, he is critical of the Court's protection of the polit-
ical rights of corporations, on the ground that their wealth gives 
them undue political power. Here again the problem is more com-
plex than Professor Miller acknowledges. Beyond doubt, corporate 
wealth creates enormous political clout. Viewed in isolation, this 
advantage is unfair. But part of their clout is used against each 
other. Besides, those who wish to regulate corporations also have 
unfair advantages-for instance, the false public perception that a 
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corporation is simply a rich, impersonal entity, rather than a repre-
sentative of the ordinary people who own its stock, or consume its 
products, and who may be hurt by a regulation that reduces corpo-
rate profits or increases the prices of corporate products. 
II 
Although James Fitzpatrick also advocates major changes in 
constitutional law, his blueprint differs markedly from Miller's. In 
Fitzpatrick's view, America was founded on Christian religious 
principles, which were both expressly and implicitly embodied in 
the Constitution. He maintains that we have lost touch with these 
principles, moving increasingly toward a secular society lacking a 
core sense of values. To counter this trend, Fitzpatrick argues that 
religious values should be reincorporated into the ethos that shapes 
our primary social institutions-the family, schools, and communi-
ties-to give people a sense of what is good about society and wor-
thy of a responsible loyalty. He develops this idea through a series 
of essays on apparently disparate topics, from John Calhoun to the 
Scopes trial to McCarthyism. In a final essay on abortion, he at-
tempts to tie all these subjects together, arguing that society has a 
right to embody its moral principles in its laws. 
Fitzpatrick introduces his essays with a quote from Edmund 
Burke: "It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things that men 
of intemperate minds cannot be free. Their passions forge their fet-
ters." The founding of this country was an attempt to prove that 
the historic checks on those "passions," a monarchy or state 
church, were unnecessary. The "great experiment," says Fitzpat-
rick, is nearly over. We have moved from a religiously based soci-
ety with a republican system of government to a secular society 
lacking the checks upon will and appetite that insure social survival. 
Fitzpatrick amplifies on this theme in his essay on the estab-
lishment clause. Beginning with the Pilgrims and the Mayflower 
Compact, he reviews some of our founding documents in an effort 
to demonstrate that colonial Americans wanted to maintain a role 
for religion in government. True, the adoption of the establishment 
clause meant that the framers rejected a theocratic society in favor 
of a national government without an established church. But they 
did not mean that it was unconstitutional for public policy to reflect 
religious convictions. The primary purpose of the establishment 
clause was to prevent sectarian strife, to prevent the national gov-
ernment from interfering with churches within individual states. In 
support of this view, Fitzpatrick cites the founding charter of 
Brown University, drafted in 1765. That charter stated that a mem-
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ber of any protestant denomination could serve as a professor or 
tutor at the university, that the university was open to students of 
all religious denominations, and that "the sectarian differences of 
opinion shall not make any part of the public and classical instruc-
tion." Fitzpatrick asserts that the quoted sentence is nearly identi-
cal to the intention of the draftsmen of the establishment clause. 
Fitzpatrick also attacks the broad scope of judicial review that 
has been adopted by the Supreme Court. His argument is not that 
Marbury was wrong, but that the Court has gone far beyond the 
position taken by Marshall in Marbury. The mistake, in his view, 
was to go from Marshall's position that acts of Congress which de-
monstrably violate the Constitution are to be declared invalid, to 
Chief Justice Hughes's position that the "Constitution is what the 
Supreme Court says it is." Nevertheless, Fitzpatrick cautions 
against overemphasizing judicial imperialism. He points out that in 
another generation it may be the liberals who will argue that the 
Court's power should be restricted. The fundamental issue, he says, 
is what society should stand for, not what governmental techniques 
it should employ. 
For Fitzpatrick the issue in the Scopes trial was whether "em-
piricism and secular humanism set loose in Europe in the eigh-
teenth-century Enlightenment will win the final victory over the 
older Biblical understanding of the nature of man and his role in 
history, the role associated with the Christian faith." He stresses 
that public schools, at least below the college level, are social insti-
tutions paid for by the people to transmit the skills and values of the 
community. Community control of the schools will help to achieve 
this, but it also requires something more: a concern for the content 
of what schools teach. 
Writing on Joseph R. McCarthy, Fitzpatrick notes that the 
late Senator is commonly reviled as more evil than a long line of 
criminals, like Leopold and Loeb and Charles Manson. So accepted 
is this view that even the average dictionary now has a pejorative 
definition of McCarthyism. Fitzpatrick argues that this negative 
characterization is a vast oversimplification of the events that sur-
rounded McCarthy. Basically his thesis is that although McCar-
thy's methods were unfortunate, McCarthy had influence because 
the American elite could not face up to the fact that communism 
was a true threat to the country. 
Fitzpatrick reserves his most emotional essay for his analysis of 
the Supreme Court's abortion decisions. Reflecting on the evolu-
tion of American attitudes, from opposing abortion to supporting a 
woman's right to abortion, Fitzpatrick likens the change to the will-
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ingness ofthe Germans to accept the Nazi regime in the 1930's. By 
denying the separate existence of the fetus, America is taking one 
more step down the road to euthanasia. Once one analyzes the 
question of human existence merely as one of viability, Fitzpatrick 
argues, there is no logical defense against infanticide, since no infant 
is viable without outside support. 
While Fitzpatrick's goal of revitalizing traditional values is 
laudable, he overlooks a critical paradox: if support for those val-
ues has diminished greatly in modem America, as seems to be the 
case, then they can no longer be enforced democratically. Commit-
ted to democracy as he is, Fitzpatrick never faces up to the possibil-
ity that his religious and cultural preferences may no longer be 
compatible with democracy. For example, even if one assumes that 
(1) abortion is wrong and (2) Roe will be overruled, it is unrealistic 
to expect that most states will tum the clock back and prohibit all 
or nearly all abortions. 
The consensus of religious belief that may have existed in 1787 
does not mean that the same convictions are equally prevalent to-
day. Moreover, Fitzpatrick has no answer for the question how to 
resolve conflicts between different groups with equally firmly held 
convictions concerning religion or morality. In one community 
Catcher In The Rye may be deemed unfit for school children, while 
in another Huckleberry Finn and Little Women may be condemned 
as preserving racial and sexual stereotypes. Conservatives are not 
the only ones who want to enforce "fundamental values." 
Despite their considerable flaws, neither of these books should 
be ignored. Fitzpatrick helps us to understand the attitudes of the 
religiously-motivated activists who are now so prominent on the 
political right. Miller's book is a valuable reminder that even in 
America the legal Constitution is not the most fundamental social 
fact, that in an important sense we have "constitutions" rather than 
"a Constitution." 
